In the British comedy film Four Lions clueless wannabe jihadists discuss a strategy succinctly expressed as, ‘bomb the mosque, radicalise the moderates’. It’s one of my favourite parts of the film, largely because, at the time I thought it was so outrageous and ill-conceived as to be ridiculous. However, after reading this clear, concise and well reasoned summary of the ‘War on Terror’ and its aftermath in the region I recognised, with horror, that 9/11 had achieved almost exactly that on an international scale. Al Qaeda’s attack on US soil had drawn such massive response it had thrown the whole region into turmoil, exacerbating sectarian grievances, precipitating huge numbers of civilian deaths as collateral damage and radicalising tens, if not hundreds, of thousands. As Kilcullen summarises in the book’s epilogue:
“The war in Iraq (commencing only 15 months after 9/11) alienated a host of potential partners and ultimately created AQI. The disaggregation strategy, after 2005, atomized the terrorist threat, just as social media and electronic connectivity were exploding in such a way as to spread the pathogen throughout our societies, enabling remote radicalisation and leaderless resistance to an unprecedented degree. The precipitate withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 revived AQI in the nick of time after it had been reduced to 90% and almost annihilated during the Surge. The precipitate pullout from Iraq, the killing of Osama bin Laden, the AQ succession crisis that followed, and the failure of the Arab Spring - all in the same key year of 2011 - helped turn AQI into ISIS and gave it a global leadership role it proceeded to exploit with utter and unprecedented ruthlessness. And complacency and hubris after bin Laden’s death, along with vacillation in the face of the colossal tragedy of the Syrian War, created the basis for a conflict that’s now consuming the Middle East and drawing regional and global powers into a hugely dangerous, and still escalating conflict”
I’ll attempt to summarise the main points of the narrative and analysis in what follows.The initial success of Afghan regime change and establishment of Karzai as new leader in 2001 lead to overconfidence about a new paradigm in warfare. Most military advisors and professionals were more hesitant about this but political confidence was very high. As a result, the 2003 invasion of Iraq was under-manned (200k should have been 400k) and left an incredibly dangerous power vacuum in the wake of Saddam Hussein's deposition. The policy of de-Baathification alienated much of the middle class and disbanded much of the Iraqi army into ready-made insurgents and militia movements.
The ‘Surge’ and introduction of David Petraeus were, according to the author, positive and necessary developments in the effort to address the violent and chaotic shambles that emerged in the aftermath of the US invasion. Obama’s election was less so as he equated leaving with the end of the war, which it certainly was not. Kilcullen feels that Obama viewed the war as not of his making, which it wasn’t, and not really his problem, which it certainly was, and thought his approach was more politically focussed than practical. He had campaigned on leaving Iraq and was dead set on accomplishing this aim. However, when American influence, troops and attention left Iraq, between 2009-11, sectarianism drastically increased. Iraqi PM Maliki who had been moderate whilst under American supervision became more of a Shia supremacist. This encouraged more Sunnis to turn to AQI for help and protection whereas previously its power and influence had been dramatically diminished. AQI was also adept in encouraging sectarian violence, sometimes even committing atrocities against other Sunnis themselves, in order provoke quid pro quo exchanges, which eventually forced Sunnis to accept AQI as their protectors for a seeming lack of other options. The killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011 also gave false hope that the War on Terror was coming to a conclusion. It did present Al Qaeda with leadership and succession issues during the crucial period of the Arab Spring movement but did little to address the root causes of extremism and insurgency that, in many ways, benefitted from the Arab Spring.
Maliki seems like a definite cause of deterioration in Iraq, his pro-Shia sectarian approach after the US left appears to have been very divisive and disenfranchised Iraqi Kurds and Sunnis. AQI may have been substantially weakened by the ‘Surge’, the tribal ‘Awakening’ and Maliki's government but ISIS, or its forerunners, appear to have found strength via relocation and collaboration in, post Arab Spring, war-torn Syria with other insurgents vs. Assad. AQI / ISIS maintained excellent networks in Syria where many foreign jihadists had trained or transitioned on their way to fight in Iraq. It then returned to Iraq post 2011 far stronger than AQI had ever been and was a more attractive proposition for Sunnis who had been abused by Maliki. This Iraqi-Syrian collaboration, or blurring of borders, was very difficult for Western policy as in Syria it was supporting insurgents against Assad while in Iraq it was supporting the government against insurgents. However, in both cases ISIS was a major player on the side of insurgency. Thus by helping Assad to defeat insurgents, including ISIS, it was actually helping a regime more brutal than the insurgents themselves; at least in a Syrian context. Here Kilcullen compares brutality via number of civilian deaths. This may have been the motivation behind some of the seemingly confused foreign policy in the region perhaps best exemplified by Obama declaring a ‘red line’ concerning Assad’s use of chemical weapons only to then do pretty much nothing when it was widely acknowledged they had been used. Iran and Russia’s foreign policies in the region had the benefit of being consistently pro-regime / anti-insurgent although it would have been hard for the US to be so pro-Shia / Iran region-wide.
The original policy of the early 2000s, disaggregation, held that local jihadi movements were being aggregated by regional and global players into a global jihad. The response was to attempt to destroy the overarching, supranational bodies and leave local insurgents disconnected allowing local authorities to deal with them individually. This strategy was quite successful insofar as AQ’s influence, and that of its affiliates, was much reduced 2003-2011. However, ISIS post-2011 appears to have a much more effective three tier structure: 1) State like central operation in Iraq and Syria occupying considerable territory including social services (courts, hospitals, utilities, food distribution etc.) advanced military (tanks, columns etc.), control of major urban areas and collection of significant revenues (taxes, oil etc.) 2) ‘wilayat’ or provinces loyal to the centre and operating on their command but separate from it. These existed in both Iraq and Syria but also in other countries (Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Saudi, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Caucuses etc.) and were deemed to be more dangerous that former AQ ‘aggregates’ because they were more formally controlled by the centre. 3) International individuals conducting terrorist attacks, mainly in the West, with little or no formal association with ISIS but claiming affiliation for their actions. As such, ISIS acted as a powerful brand, attracting dissidents in a highly informal and disaggregated way, highlighting the drawbacks of the disaggregation strategy. Furthermore, individuals with almost no connection to the centre, often radicalised entirely via electronic means, are far more difficult for police to monitor and identify than more formal cells.
2015 appears to have been a very troubling year in terms of the strength and sophistication shown by ISIS and AQI across all levels of its three tier structure. The ISIS capture of Ramadi, in central Iraq, was apparently textbook in military terms and demonstrated how advanced the organisation had become. Also, the capture of Palmyra, in Syria, made many civilians far more well disposed towards ISIS. The Assad regime had destroyed water, electricity and sewage facilities before fleeing the city in convoys prior to ISIS’ arrival. The regime also made it hard for ordinary citizens, many of whom had been helping the government troops, to leave the city despite their own retreat. Furthermore, they bombed the city with little regard for civilians as ISIS arrived having failed to attack them during their approach over the open landscape surrounding the city. However, when ISIS arrived they reestablished basic services, distributed food, provided clothing and made medical care available in Raqqi via a safe road. As such, many locals, unsurprisingly, had a very dim view of Assad’s government troops and saw themselves as having been rescued by ISIS! This view may have changed following ISIS’ exploitation and destruction of the ancient ruins near the town that had been the lynchpin of the area's tourist driven economy.
The JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, July 2015) agreement between US-EU-Iran had interesting and far-reaching consequences for the foreign policy environment in Iraq-Syria. While the US was anti-Assad and pro non-ISIS insurgents in Syria it was also lifting sanctions on Iran via the nuclear deal, giving them vastly increased access to capital and weapons. Both Iran and Russia had been active in supporting an otherwise failing Assad regime in Syria. As such, many moderate, anti-Assad, anti-ISIS rebels in Syria felt that the US had sold them out by agreeing to such a deal with Iran, which they saw as an acceptance that Assad’s regime could not be overthrown. Furthermore, traditionally US friendly countries in the region, such as Saudi, Turkey, Egypt, Gulf States and Israel, were critical of the deal. Egypt and Saudi launched a military force to counter Iranian backed Houthis in Yemen in the deal’s aftermath, representing an increase in proxy tensions in the region. Turkey’s concerns centred on Iranian influence in the region, partly via an Assad regime it detested, and the risk of increasing Kurdish separatism within its own borders. As such, it was probably less concerned about the nuclear aspects of JCPOA and more on the scope it gave Iran to increase its proxy war in Iraq-Syria. After the treaty it entered the conflict by allowing the coalition access to its airbases and attacking Kurdish positions itself in Syria and Iraq.
At around the same time, huge numbers of refugees began overflowing from Middle Eastern ‘safe havens’ like Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon into Europe causing a humanitarian crisis and bringing the effects of events in the region 2011-2015 into mainstream media focus. While this was on-going, coalition troops were withdrawing from Afghanistan, which allowed Taliban units that had been hiding in Pakistan to regroup and, eventually, attack and capture the city of Kunduz in September 2015. Following this ISIS groups from Pakistan and Afghanistan also conducted attacks in the Afghanistan / Pakistan region and ISIS vs Taliban power struggles intensified, perhaps partly owing to a knowledge of Mullah Omar, the erstwhile leader of the Taliban’s, death.
Russia’s increased presence in the Syria-Iraq region was inaugurated by Putin’s speech to the UN in September 2015, which contains some thought provoking, albeit hypocritical, remarks (pp185-6):
“We all know that after the end of the Cold War - everyone is aware of that - a single centre of domination emerged in the world, and then those who found themselves at the top of the pyramid were tempted to think that if they were so strong and exceptional, they knew better and they did not have to reckon with the UN...We also remember certain episodes from the history of the Soviet Union. ‘Social Experiments’ for export, attempts to push for changes within other countries based on ideological preferences, often led to tragic consequences and to degradation rather than progress. It seems, however, that far from learning from others’ mistakes, everyone just keeps repeating them, and so the export of revolutions, this time of so-called “democratic” ones continues...I cannot help asking those who have caused the situation, do you realise now what you’ve done?...Tens of thousands of militants are fighting under the banners of the so-called IS. Its ranks include former Iraqi servicemen who were thrown out into the street after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Many recruits also come from Libya, a country whose statehood was destroyed as a result of a gross violation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1973. And now, the ranks of radicals are being joined by members of the so-called “moderate” Syrian opposition supported by Western countries. First, they are armed and trained, and then they defect to the IS”
While the coalition had attempted to fight against ISIS, Russia’s strategy was very much to fight for Assad against all types of insurgents. Their approach was far more heavy handed, providing much heavier air support, materiel and troops, and far less focussed on reducing civilian casualties, in keeping with Assad’s own style. While most of the US-led coalition efforts had concentrated on ISIS, only around 10% of the Russian efforts focussed specifically on ISIS with the rest directed towards any and every enemy of Assad. For all its shortcomings, Russia’s policy does have the advantage of being more consistent than the coalitions. It is against any kind of insurgency and will back dictators, like Assad, or democratically elected governments, like in Iraq, in order to suppress them. The US-led coalition, however, finds itself pro some insurgents, anti others and, in the case of Libya, arming some only to lose confidence in them and withdraw support.
This lack of leadership from the US has seriously compromised its position and credibility as the global police force and, in many ways, JCPOA has handed that role in the Middle East to Iran cooperating with, and supported by, Russia. If Bush’s invasion demonstrated the error of maximalist policies and over-reaction then Obama’s muddling light-touch and overly hasty withdrawal has shown the error of under-reaction, hesitation and timidity. The situation now is worse than it was immediately post 9/11 as the West now faces two (ISIS and AQ) far better organised, better armed, better trained and internationalised extremist organisations in a region riddled with sectarian conflict, violence and weak governance. In a gruesome, morbid way you have to look at the actions of 9/11 as a huge success strategically for AQ / ISIS. It catapulted them onto the international stage, garnered new recruits for its cause, encouraged new allegiances, inspired new insurgent organisations, drew a massive, destabilising response from the enemy, brought arms and money to the region, radicalised vast swathes of the population and has ultimately led to growth and proliferation of its world view and proponents who espouse it.
For the author, leaving the region to look after itself or be overseen by Iran is a not a sensible option.There are two large, well armed and well organised extremist groups (ISIS and AQ) both with perhaps 35-40k troops. They are attracting disaffected people in the region, many of them young, and motivating them to destabilise and do harm to more moderate and inclusive regimes, as well as to do harm to their allies and supporters in the West. As such, a strategy of active containment appears to him as the best of a bad lot of strategic options given the fractured political landscape in the region. Will moderate insurgents in Syria fight against ISIS if it has no support from the West and the Assad regime it ultimately wants to dislodge is strongly supported by Iran and Russia? Will any Iraqi government be inclusive enough to persuade Sunnis and Kurds to prefer it to their own separatist movements? Will the reduction in troops and presence in Afghanistan lead to a loss of territory and urban areas to AQ and ISIS as has happened in Syria and Iraq? Whatever the case, the political and religious landscape in the region is so complex any solution or movement towards improvement will take a long time and there will be no quick, easy solution to the problems.
The attacks in Paris during November, 2015 are particularly worrisome as they were of considerable sophistication and coordination. Well drilled and resourced guerilla teams with access to military weapons, explosives, safe houses, vehicles and forged documents point to the existence of extensive underground networks existing in European cities like Paris and Brussels; perhaps even a IS Wilayat in an EU country. In turn, this also raises the possibility that ISIS / AQI will use tactics similar to those used to escalate violence between Sunnis and Shias in Iraq; using violence to divide the population along Muslim / non-Muslim or White / Arab lines to encourage radicalisation. The French response was to deploy an aircraft carrier, conduct extensive airstrikes on Syria and ask its fellow EU member states to join it in a ‘pitiless war on Islamic State’.
As someone who knows little about this complicated area of geopolitics, I found this book to be happily clear and methodical. It introduces the main players, events and themes of the historical narrative without delving into the kind of detail that would make it five times longer and ten times less comprehensible to the non-specialist. The author expresses views, and I’m not well informed enough to comment on their merit, but they’re all supported by reasoned argument and do not seem needlessly partisan or biased. Indeed, Kilcullen isn’t afraid to apportion blame to everyone declaring at one point that there is more than enough of it to go round. The language and style are clear and analytical. There is, inevitably, some Australian American-style military jargon, e.g. “getting out in front of the imagination curve” but this is mercifully rare given the author’s background! All in all, I found it an enjoyable and informative read on what is, undoubtedly, a hideously complex topic but one that, sadly, may continue to grow in global significance over the coming years.
